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Abstract Both written and graphic accounts of history can be biased by the
perspective of the historian. O’Hara (Biol Philos 7:135–160, 1992) has demon-
strated that this also applies to evolutionary history and its historians, and identiﬁed
four narrative devices that introduce anthropocentricisms into accounts of phylog-
eny. In the current paper, I identify a ﬁfth such narrative device, viz. the left–right
ordering of the taxa at the tips of cladograms. I deﬁne two measures that make it
possible to quantify the degree of anthropocentricism of cladograms, the human
attention score and human rightness score. I then carry out an analysis of the
presence of the different distorting mechanisms in phylogenetic textbooks. I
deliberately chose two textbooks that adopted a cladistic perspective, since their
authors can be assumed to be more conscious about the aim of avoiding anthro-
pocentricisms. Three of the narrative devices are thus absent from cladistic works.
However, there is a weak tendency that the resolution of cladogram branches is
biased in favour of Homo sapiens. Furthermore, the human perspective is clear and
highly signiﬁcant in the positioning of taxa along the left–right axis of cladograms. I
discuss the reasons for and implications of these biased presentations.
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Introduction
Just as history can be represented by fundamentally different narratives, depending
on the background of the historian (i.e., her or his ethnic, social, sexual, political
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DOI 10.1007/s10539-007-9102-xbackground etc.), the presentation of the evolutionary past is not independent of it
being written down by only one species. In an excellent essay on this topic, Robert
O’Hara (1992) has enumerated different ‘‘narrative devices’’ that implicitly
introduce a human perspective into representations of the evolutionary past. The
consequence of these distortions is that most biologically untrained people’s
understanding of the principles of evolution is severely biased.
With this paper, I intend to do two things: to add a ﬁfth narrative device to
O’Hara’s list, and to examine how common the different devices are in
representations of evolutionary history.
Five ways to distort evolutionary history
O’Hara (1992, pp. 144–149) described four narrative devices commonly used in
both scientiﬁc and popular, graphic and written accounts of evolutionary history.
These devices are (1) the sequencing of contemporary taxa, (2) the pruning of side
branches, (3) the use of paraphyletic groups, and (4) the differential resolution of
branches. All narrative devices distort evolutionary history, normally by favouring
the perspective or position of a single species, viz. our own, Homo sapiens. Instead
of our species as such, the focus may also be on larger taxa, which, in this case, use
to encompass Homo sapiens as one of its subgroups. This means that even though
some narratives do not even mention man, they may still be anthropocentric by
favouring the perspective of primates (Primates), mammals (Mammalia), terrestrial
vertebrates (Tetrapoda), vertebrates (Vertebrata), or multicellular animals (Meta-
zoa). In these cases, the ‘‘resolution’’ chosen for the narrative is too coarse to
mention humans speciﬁcally. In the following, I will use the term focal taxon rather
than ‘‘man’’ because (a) the focal taxon might not be Homo sapiens but a more
inclusive taxon containing this species, because (b) the methods described below are
equally applicable to any taxon of interest and to questions unrelated to Homo
sapiens, and because (c) I would like to avoid the androcentricism inherent in the
English vernacular name of Homo sapiens.
I will now ﬁrst explain O’Hara’s narrative devices in some more detail, before
deﬁning a ﬁfth device:
(1) The sequencing of contemporary taxa is the arrangement of taxa in such a way
that an—often implicit—narrative axis passes through the diagram, culminat-
ing in the focal taxon, which is placed, in graphical representation, at top or, in
written representations, at the end of the narrative. The mistake is, of course,
that contemporary taxa cannot possibly be related to each other in a linear
sequence. All contemporary taxa are endpoints of evolutionary, branching
lineages, each with its own, unique evolutionary history. Sequencing may be
heuristically useful for certain purposes, but clearly not for illustrating
evolutionary history.
(2) The pruning of side branches is characteristic of narratives that place a certain
species at the top of a row of reconstructed stem species. In writing, the same
is achieved if the narrative proceeds along the stem species of the focal
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123species. In both cases, other species that arose from the same stem species are
ignored. This has the effect of creating ‘‘a ‘main line’ of evolution’’ (O’Hara
1992, p. 147), while all other lines are ignored or suppressed, even though they
are equally real and important.
(3) Paraphyletic groups abound in certain presentations of evolutionary trees,
especially as ‘‘stem groups’’ in phylograms. This practice subsumes in an
artiﬁcial grouping all species (extinct or otherwise) that do not belong to the
focal taxon. By doing so, again, more attention is apportioned to the focal
taxon.
(4) Differential resolution describes the practice to collapse different parts of a
tree to differing degrees. In the extreme case, one can imagine a comb-like tree
with all groups except the focal taxon collapsed into one unbranched terminal
taxon (Fig. 1a).
(5) The ﬁfth narrative device, which I want to add, is the arrangement of taxa in a
cladogram along the left–right axis (given a vertically drawn time axis). This
narrative device may be perceived as a special case of O’Hara’s ﬁrst one, but
he did not include branching trees into this category. Unless the topology of a
branching tree is a comb (cf. device 4), the terminal taxa of a tree do not
constitute a sequence. Therefore, and to emphasize the importance of left–right
ordering, it seems appropriate to mention this point as a ﬁfth narrative device.
What all these narrative devices have in common, is that they distort evolutionary
history by imposing a trend on it. The devices implicitly or explicitly make one
taxon the focus and end-point of the narrative. This, in turn, suggests that the
evolutionary process underlying the historical account had been aiming for that
focal taxon. Needless to say, this is not in accordance with modern evolutionary
thought. Evolution is no longer understood as a directed process.
Consequently, the ﬁrst two narrative devices are nowadays restricted to drawings
and popular accounts of evolution. Although those might be the sources for most of
laypeople’s evolutionary knowledge (for examples, see O’Hara 1992), I will not
consider them further in this analysis. A special situation is the practice, especially
among molecular systematists, to display species names at the tips of branches
whether or not they are each others’ closest relatives (e.g., ‘‘man, rat, chicken, trout,
rhubarb, yeast’’). Such species are readily interpreted by fellow scientists to be
representatives of larger lineages. This is not strictly speaking a case of pruning,
because all species included in the study are normally displayed. Rather, this
practice makes explicit which representatives have been chosen from which
Fig. 1 Example topologies illustrating anthropocentricisms in cladograms. All cladograms have four tips
(terminal taxa). The dot symbolises Homo sapiens (or another focal taxon), the bold line the path leading
to the focal taxon. Below the cladograms, the human attention score (before the slash) and the human
rightness score are speciﬁed (after the slash)
Anthropocentricisms in cladograms 427
123lineages. I do not intend to discuss the merits or disadvantages of this practice here,
and will only consider tree drawings that have not deliberately excluded certain
branches.
The third device is, by deﬁnition, not found in cladograms or taxonomic systems
obtained by means of cladistic analysis, i.e., in phylogenetic systematics. However,
many biological textbooks are still using taxonomic groupings that are based on
evolutionary systematics, so students of biology still meet this kind of distortion of
the evolutionary past. In most scientiﬁc papers and books, on the other hand, taxa
that are known to be paraphyletic are avoided. This reduces the prevalence of this
device.
However, the fourth and ﬁfth device can also be found in cladograms or
phylogenetic systems. The remainder of this manuscript investigates the occurrence
of these narrative devices in some scientiﬁc books that explicitly adopt cladistic
approaches.
Two numeric measures of anthropocentricism
In order to look for the presence of narrative devices in published cladograms, one
needs some sort of metric to represent the degree of anthropocentricism. I here
deﬁne two such scores and accompanying signiﬁcance tests, measuring the attention
given to the focal taxon or its placement in a cladogram. Both scores and tests are
based on the assumption that all branchings are dichotomous (bifurcating).
The human attention score aims at measuring to which degree the resolution of
the branches in a cladogram favours our own species/the focal taxon. It is based on
two variables, the number of tips of a cladogram, t; and the number of branches that
are side branches to the focal taxon, s. The number of tips is straightforward to
count. The number of side branches is identical to the number of internal nodes
between the focal taxon itself (which is not counted) and the cladogram’s basalmost
node (which is counted). The human attention score is then calculated as
Humanattentionscore ¼
1
2
þ
1
2
 
if s[lbt : ðs   lbtÞ=ðt   1   lbtÞ
if s lbt : ðs   lbtÞ=ðlbt   1Þ
(
with t [ 2; number of tips; s 2½ 1;t   1 ; number of side branches; lb, binary
logarithm (log2). This score has the following desirable properties:
(a) It can attain values between zero and unity, inclusively.
(b) It reaches its maximum value (unity) if and only if the cladogram is a perfectly
comb-like tree where all branches are completely unresolved side branches to
the focal taxon (e.g., Fig. 1a).
(c) It reaches its minimum value (zero) if and only if the focal taxon is a
completely unresolved side branch to the remainder of the cladogram (e.g.,
Fig. 1c).
(d) It attains the value 0.5 if and only is the cladogram is perfectly balanced (e.g.,
Fig. 1b).
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123Of course, the scaling of the score is not only convenient but also arbitrary—the
score could have been scaled in many other ways. The signiﬁcance test described
below is not sensitive to the speciﬁc values of the score, however. Rather, it relies
on whether the score of an observed cladogram is higher or lower relative to other
possible topologies. The order of scores is not affected by the scaling chosen.
The signiﬁcance test of the human attention score consists of calculating two
numbers and their ratio. The denominator is the number of possible tree topologies
that can be used to displace the interrelationships of the same taxon as in the
cladogram observed, holding the root and the number of tips constant. The
numerator is the number of these topologies that have the same human attention
score as, or a higher human attention score than, the observed topology. In other
words, the signiﬁcance test asks the following question: ‘‘What is the probability
that a cladogram constrained to have t tips is at least as anthropocentric as the one
observed, if the resolution of the cladogram’s branches is randomly assigned?’’
Calculation of the denominator may require some more explanation: it speciﬁes
the number of possible topologies given rooted, unlabelled and bifurcating trees
with t tips, and given the additional condition that topologies are counted as
different even if they could be rendered congruent by rotating any number of
branches around their nodes (see Felsenstein (2004) for a deﬁnition of the terms
‘‘rooted’’, ‘‘unlabelled’’ and ‘‘bifurcating’’). Expressed in other words, the
denominator is the number of ways the original cladogram could be modiﬁed by
collapsing two (or more) sister tips into one branch, and resolving tips into two (or
more) daughter branches. In this process, the total number of tips and the identity of
the basalmost node (root) must not be changed. The original topology is also
counted. For example, in the case of a three-tip cladogram (A–(B–C)), there is only
one such alternative to the topology observed: the two sister tips (B and C) can be
collapsed into one, and the third tip (A) can be shown with a higher resolution ((A1–
A2)–BC). The denominator is thus a function of the number of tips alone, where
three tips result in two topologies, four tips in ﬁve topologies, and 5–12 tips in 14,
42, 132, 429, 1430, 4862, 16796 and 58786 possible topologies, respectively.
For simplicity, one might add the convention that the focal taxon always be
placed at the rightmost position in all tree topologies. This assumption does not
affect the outcome (in contradistinction to the rightness score described below), but
it may make the counting a bit easier if done by hand.
The calculation of the human attention score is based on the assumptions that all
tips that are resolved into daughter branches are in fact resolvable. This assumption
is violated if some of the tips in the original cladogram are species (or species-poor
taxa). In such cases, the resolution of the cladogram is constrained by the balance of
the factual phylogeny (Farris 1976; Slowinski 1990; Kirkpatrick and Slatkin 1993),
and not only a result of arbitrary decisions made by the scientist drawing the
cladogram. I will return to an example of such a case in the Discussion.
For trees to be signiﬁcantly anthropocentric according to this measure, a
cladogram of at least six tips is required. A human attention score of 1 will then
have a probability of 0.024.
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the cladograms cannot simply be combined in one graph, since this can affect the
attention score. To illustrate why, imagine that the information contained in one
comb-like cladogram can be spread over a series of smaller cladograms with two
tips each, all of which would (by deﬁnition) be perfectly balanced. The situation can
therefore be addressed by averaging the scores of all cladograms. The probability
must then be derived by bootstrapping: for a number of iterations, the number of
side branches of each of the cladograms is randomised (again holding the number of
tips of each cladogram constant). The proportion of average randomised human
attention scores being equal to or higher than the one observed, is then the
probability.
The human rightness score measures to which degree the focal species is placed
at the right-hand side of the cladogram. It is based on the ratio r/n of two counts of
nodes. The denominator n is the total number of nodes on the way from (and
including) the basalmost one all the way up to (and excluding) the focal tip. The
numerator r is the number of these nodes were one has to go to the right-hand side
on the way up to the focal tip. If the focal tip is the rightmost tip of the cladogram,
one has to go to the right-hand side at all nodes (r = n; e.g., Fig. 1c), and the human
rightness score is unity. Correspondingly, if the focal tip is the leftmost tip (r = 0),
the human rightness score is zero. A human rightness score of 0.5 is obtained if, on
the way from the root to the focal taxon, one has to turn left and right equally often.
The signiﬁcance test of the human rightness score consists of calculating two
numbers and their ratio. The denominator is the number of possible paths one could
take from the root up to the focal taxon if the number of nodes between the root and
the focal tip is held constant. This number can be obtained by rotating all branches
around their nodes. (Nodes that do not lie on the path from the root to the focal
taxon are of course ignored, since these do not affect the outcome.) As there are two
possibilities (turn right or turn left) for each node on this path, the denominator
equals 2
n.
The numerator is the number of these different paths that result in the same
human rightness score as, or a higher human rightness score than, the path observed
in the cladogram. This number can be derived from the (n + 1)th row of Pascal’s
triangle, summing its elements r + 1t on + 1. For trees to be signiﬁcantly
anthropocentric according to this second measure, a cladogram of at least ﬁve tips is
required. A human rightness score of 1 will then have a probability of 0.031.
To estimate the total human rightness score for a number of related cladograms,
those cladograms are simply combined in one large tree with unchanged topology
and unchanged left–right sorting. Contrary to the human attention score, the human
rightness score is not affected by the subdivision of one cladogram into several
small ones. Consequently, there is no need for special adjustment in order to obtain
the overall probability. It is simply calculated from the combined topology.
A possible modiﬁcation of the human rightness score is to transform it to a
‘‘human utterness score’’ by assuming that the outermost position on the left-hand
side gives equally much attention to the focal taxon as the outermost position on the
right-hand side. This test can be viewed as a two-tailed version of the (one-tailed)
human rightness score, and its probability is calculated accordingly. It may also be
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123most appropriate in cases were the cladograms are arranged from top to bottom, or
in other cases were it is not obvious that one should expect a left-to-right reading
norm.
The two scores are illustrated in Fig. 1 with three simple cladograms consisting
of four tips. Topology 1b is perfectly balanced (human attention score of 0.5). The
remaining two cladograms have comblike topologies, 1a in favour of the focal taxon
and 1c in disfavour of it (human attention scores of 1 and 0, respectively). As
regards ‘‘human rightness’’, topology 1b is the least anthropocentric (score of 1/
2 = 0.5), followed by 1a (2/3 = 0.67) and 1c (1/1 = 1). None of the biases in
Fig. 1 are signiﬁcant because the number of tips is too small to enable a distinction
between random and systematic biases. R functions to calculate the two scores and
their probabilities are available from the author.
1
A case study using phylogenetic textbooks
The algorithms developed above were applied to two textbooks in animal
phylogenetics, Das System der Metazoa (Ax 1995–2001) and Animal evolution
(Nielsen 2001). Nielsen summarised all relevant information in one cladogram (his
Fig. 1.2). Ax, however, had subdivided the animal phylogeny into several smaller
portions. Some of those cladograms overlap in the taxa displayed. In those cases,
only one of the overlapping cladograms was utilised in my analysis. This was to
ensure statistical independence within my sample of tree topologies.
The results of the analyses are summarised in Table 1 for the human attention
score, and in Table 2 for the human rightness score.
Table 1 Anthropocentricisms in two cladistic textbooks of animal evolution as measured by the human
attention score
Author/(volume)/ﬁgure Number of tips Side branches Human attention score Probability
Ax/I/12 8 6 0.875 0.016
Ax/III/33 7 6 1.000 0.0076
Ax/III/68 4 2 0.500 0.60
Ax/III/74 6 1 0.000 1.00
Ax/III/84 4 1 0.000 1.00
Ax/III/89 8 3 0.500 0.38
Ax/III/106 18 5 0.532 0.13
Ax/unweighted mean 0.487 0.12
Ax/weighted mean 0.538 0.016
Nielsen/1.2 32 6 0.519 0.084
The resolution of the cladograms’ branches is weakly biased in favour of Homo sapiens
1 The R functions (R development core team 2005) used to calculate the human attention score, the
human rightness score, and the accompanying probabilities are available on the World Wide Web at the
URL http://www.evol.no/hanno/08/BiolPhil.htm.
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text that used one cladogram. In Das System der Metazoa, results differed among
different cladograms, two out of seven being signiﬁcantly anthropocentric. The
overall results for this book depended on whether or not the different cladograms
were weighted by their number of tips. The unweighted score was not signiﬁcant,
while the weighted score was. The ﬁndings are thus somewhat ambiguous. As
weighting by numbers of tips is probably not justiﬁed in this case, one can conclude
that Ax, overall, was able to avoid this aspect of anthropocentricism.
The human rightness score, on the other hand, was highly signiﬁcant in both
textbooks (p\0.001), indicating that the position of man was indeed not randomly
chosen. The taxon containing our species was systematically placed at the rightmost
position in all cladograms but one. The only exception was Ax’s ﬁgure III/106,
which was adopted from another publication without changing the topology of the
original cladogram (Waddell et al. 1999). Using two-tailed tests (i.e., estimating
human ‘‘utterness’’ rather than ‘‘rightness’’) did not change the picture: although the
probabilities were modiﬁed, signiﬁcance levels remained largely unaffected.
Discussion: why anthropocentricism matters
The past 150 years have seen a gradual reduction in the anthropocentricism in
biological systematics. Darwin (1859) removed the basis of beliefs that evolution is
a directed process, and that Homo sapiens was the goal of evolution (or creation).
The Darwinian mode of evolution is also incompatible with the idea that extant
species can stand in ancestor–descendant relations to each other. Instead, extant
species share common ancestors, from which they all descend. At this stage, the two
ﬁrst narrative devices lost their justiﬁcation. Of course, this did not prevent them
from turning up in a variety of scientiﬁc accounts through the decades (e.g., Romer
Table 2 Anthropocentricisms in two cladistic textbooks of animal evolution as measured by the human
rightness score
Author/(volume)/ﬁgure Number of
nodes
Human
node
Human
rightness
score
One-tailed
probability
Two-tailed
probability
Ax/I/12 6 6 1.00 0.016 0.031
Ax/III/33 6 6 1.00 0.016 0.031
Ax/III/68 2 2 1.00 0.25 0.50
Ax/III/74 1 1 1.00 0.50 1.00
Ax/III/84 1 1 1.00 0.50 1.00
Ax/III/89 3 3 1.00 0.13 0.25
Ax/III/106 5 1 0.20 0.97 0.31
Ax/all ﬁgures combined 24 20 0.83 0.00077 0.0013
Ax/ﬁgures combined
excluding the last ﬁgure
19 19 1.00 0.0000019 0.0000038
Nielsen/1.2 11 11 1.00 0.00049 0.00098
The left–right ordering of taxa in the cladograms is strongly biased in favour of Homo sapiens
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1231959). By now, however, such distortions of evolutionary history are largely
restricted to the popular domain.
The second milestone was the ‘‘cladistic revolution’’ (Halstead 1978), started by
Hennig (1950). His ‘‘phylogenetic systematics’’ identiﬁed monophyly as a desirable
property of systematic entities. By doing so, Hennig removed human opinion and
authoritative decisions from evolutionary biology. The phylogenetic (or cladistic)
way of systemising threw out the arbitrariness of classiﬁcation and replaced it by the
scientiﬁc rigor of phylogenetics. It might not be intuitively clear why this should be
relevant for anthropocentricism. The relevance lies in the fact that there is not a
single paraphyletic taxon that incorporates the human species. On the other hand,
quite many paraphyletic groupings denote taxa that would have been monophyletic
if they had not been erected to the exclusion of a taxon containing man. Obviously,
one unwritten rule for the erection of paraphyla was that they must not contain
Homo sapiens. Examples of such paraphyla are ‘‘Pongidae’’ (= Hominidae sensu
lato less Homo), ‘‘Prosimii’’ (= Primates less Anthropoidea), ‘‘Marsupionta’’ (=
Mammalia less Placentalia), ‘‘Reptilia’’ (= Amniota less Aves and [crown-
]Mammalia), ‘‘Anamnia’’ (Vertebrata less Amniota), ‘‘Osteichthyes’’ (= Osteogna-
thostomata less Tetrapoda), ‘‘Invertebrata’’ (Metazoa less Vertebrata),
‘‘Coelenterata’’ (Eumetazoa less Bilateria), ‘‘Protoctista’’ (Eukaryota less multicel-
lular organisms), ‘‘Prokaryota’’ (Vita less Eukaryota). Inventing paraphyletic taxa
that include our species may be a useful and funny exercise. Such taxa, like
O’Hara’s (1992, p. 154) ‘‘Anarthropoda’’, are so obviously absurd that no
evolutionary taxonomist would ever have adopted them, no matter how large the
phenetic gap between two sister taxa. When the phenetic gap that isolates tetrapods
from lungﬁshes is large enough to justify the erection of a paraphyletic
‘‘Osteichthyes’’—why doesn’t the same apply to other taxa with many and very
distinct autapomorphies, like the echinoderms and cnidarians? However, I suspect it
is unthinkable even for evolutionary taxonomists to subdivide the Bilateria into the
two superphyla ‘‘Anechinodermata’’ (= Chordata + Enteropneusta + Pterobran-
chia + Protostomia + Acoelomorpha) and Echinodermata, or to subdivide the
Metazoa into the two subkingdoms ‘‘Acnidaria’’ (= Bilateria + Cte-
nophora + Porifera + Trichoplax adhaerens) and Cnidaria.
One might have thought that with the acceptance of Darwinian evolution and
cladistic methodology, anthropocentricism was ﬁnally banned from evolutionary
narratives, at least in scientiﬁc publications. This was the background for limiting
my case study to textbooks that explicitly adopted a cladistic perspective. As one
aim of phylogenetic systematists is to present phylogenetic history in a way that is
independent of the opinion of authorities, one might expect that they are more
conscious about avoiding anthropocentricisms than the average author of evolu-
tionary textbooks. However, as my results show, this is merely wishful thinking.
Two distorting devices can still occur even in state-of-the-art phylogenetic
cladograms, and at least one of them is prevalent in textbooks: the taxon containing
Homo sapiens is quite consistently placed at the rightmost position of each
cladogram. There was also a trend that the resolution of cladogram branches is
biased in favour of our own species (p\0.10).
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123These two narrative devices—i.e., O’Hara’s fourth one and the one proposed by
me—can be illustrated with Fig. 2. All trees in this ﬁgure are cladograms of the
same taxon, viz. jawed vertebrates (Gnathostomata). Figure 2a is perfectly
balanced, thus having eliminated device no. 4, but the taxon containing man
(Choanata) is placed at the right, thus using device no. 5. The balance of the tree
gives as much emphasis to ‘‘side branches’’ as to the branch leading to Homo
sapiens and other Choanata. On the other hand, this branch is emphasized more than
the others by placing it in the upper right corner, thus implying that one ‘‘has to read
the graph’’ towards Choanata.
Figure 2b is attempting to distribute taxa along the left–right axis in an objective
way, thus eliminating device no. 5, but it is extremely unbalanced, thus using device
no. 4. Every taxon’s relative place was determined according to the number of
described extant species within the taxon. This places the taxon containing man,
Theria, somewhere in the middle of the tree. On the other hand, all taxa not
including man are collapsed into only one single terminal taxon, resulting in a
perfectly comb-like tree topology, again at the disadvantage of non-human taxa. Of
course, it is possible to combine the advantages of both cladograms in one ﬁgure,
just turning some branches of Fig. 2a around their own axes, the result of which is
shown in Fig. 2c.
Figure 2d shows a fourth out of the over 36,000 possibilities to depict
gnathostome phylogeny using 8 tips. In this last illustration, the cladogram is
maximally unbalanced, but this time to the advantage of the beluga or European
Fig. 2 Fouroutofmorethan36,000possibilitiesto represent gnathostome phylogenyusingeighttips.See
text for further explanations. (English vernacular names, where existent: Acipenserinae = true sturgeons,
Actinopteri = true ray-ﬁnned ﬁshes, Actinopterygii = ray-ﬁnned ﬁshes, Callorhinchus = elephantﬁshes,
Chondrichthyes = cartilaginous ﬁshes, Dipnoi = lungﬁshes, Elasmobranchii = sharks and rays,
Holocephalii = chimaeras, Huso dauricus = kaluga, Huso huso = beluga, Latimeria = coelacanths,
Osteognathostomata = bony vertebrates, Polyodontidae = paddleﬁshes, Polypteridae = bichirs,
Sauropsida = birds and reptiles, Theria = true [viviparous] mammals.)
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123sturgeon (Huso huso) and to the disadvantage of Sarcopterygii (including Homo
sapiens) and ﬁve other side branches. Such presentations are quite uncommon, even
though ichthyocentric cladograms are as justiﬁed as anthropocentric cladograms
(but see Scott (1986) for a papiliocentric tree of life).
Finally, Fig. 3 shows an attempt of displaying the phylogeny of Gnathostomata
as balanced as possible, resolving all branches to the same degree as the therian
branch in Fig. 2a. Figure 3 also illustrates that there are natural constraints to
perfectly balanced trees: the tree of life is not itself perfectly balanced (Guyer and
Slowinski 1991; Mooers 1995; Mooers and Heard 2002), and several of the
branches in Fig. 3 cannot be shown with higher resolution because they represent
single species. This is why this tree does not have 2
7 = 128 tips but merely 76.
One might argue that the use of these narrative devices has certain advantages,
i.e., that anthropocentric cladograms are not only negative. As regards device no. 4,
using balanced trees such as Fig. 3 needs far more space for representing the same
bunch of the tree than comb-like trees such as Fig. 2b. This depends of course on the
aim of the cladogram. When one wants to tell the history of man (or any other
taxon), and nothing else, comb-like trees are, of course, perfectly suited. However,
in zoology textbooks this is normally not the intention, instead the reader is
expected to get an impression of zoological diversity. This may be better achieved
by using balanced trees. What is otherwise suggested is that there is no ‘‘relevant’’
or ‘‘interesting’’ diversity in ‘‘side branches’’.
It might also be argued that, because the tree of life itself is not balanced (cf.
Fig. 3), cladogram balance is not a desirable attribute in the ﬁrst place. In most
cases, however, cladogram resolution is not constrained by the topology of the tree
of life. Moreover, even in the cases where it is, it may be very useful heuristically to
visualise that some tips in fact are species or species-poor taxa. This makes readers
of the cladogram understand that biodiversity is indeed not distributed uniformly
across the tree of life (as implicitly suggested by the straitjacket of Linnean
categories, see below).
A further problem of balanced trees, also pointed out by O’Hara (1992, p. 150f),
is that there are certain well-known taxon names and that these are not equally
distributed among taxa with the same rank.
2 As illustrated by Fig. 2a, very few of
the names appearing at the tips of the cladogram will be known to a reader who is
not already familiar with vertebrate phylogeny. That Choanata includes lungﬁshes
(Dipnoi) and terrestrial vertebrates (Tetrapoda) is only known to specialists (many
of whom would not even use the scientiﬁc name Choanata, but prefer other names
Fig. 3 Phylogeny of gnathostomes using a maximally balanced representation and resolving up to seven
bifurcations per branch. The phylogeny follows Sandvik (2001) and references therein. The sorting
criterion for taxa along the vertical axis is their species number (see text)
c
2 By rank I refer to a relative measure of a taxon’s inclusiveness (Ax 1995–2001). It can be envisaged as
being inversely proportional to the number of nodes between a taxon and the root of the tree. This
measure is relative in such a way that sister taxa always have the same rank, while subordinated
(superordinated) taxa have lower (higher) rank. Linnean categories are sometimes referred to as ranks,
too, but those two concepts are unrelated.
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123such as Rhipidistia sensu lato). Likewise, that Callorhinchus and Chimaeroidea
together constitute the chimaeras (Holocephalii), or that Galea and Squalea together
represent the rays and sharks (Elasmobranchii), will not be visible from the
cladogram, unless names of higher taxa are displayed above the tips (as is shown in
Fig. 2a, but not Fig. 2b–d). In such cases, perfect tree balance does not necessarily
seem to outweigh the loss of information. A compromise would be to display one
more branching in the rightmost branch of Fig. 2a, and to add names of higher taxa
above the names of the tips.
As regards device no. 5, also the anthropocentric left–right orientation has certain
advantages, not the least a better orientation of untrained biologists in the tree.
However, this argument seems to be mostly a question of habit (and practice), as it
also could be applied to device no. 3. (In fact it has been applied, by claiming that
evolutionary systematics is more in accord with commonsense than phylogenetic
systematics; Halstead 1978; Mayr and Bock 2002.) After all, taxa have to be sorted
in one way or another, and as all sorting criteria are equally correct, it does not
really seem to matter whether the criterion chosen is the phylogenetic distance to
Homo sapiens.
What, then, are the disadvantages of anthropocentric cladograms, and do they
weigh more than the advantages? Evidence that anthropocentric cladograms are
indeed problematic comes from student questionnaires (O’Hara 1997; H. Sandvik,
unpublished manuscript). If students are asked to draw the tree of life, they
generally produce drawings that place Homo sapiens in a prominent position (either
on top of the drawing or on its right-hand side). This in itself does not tell us
whether the choice to draw a tree in this way is based on misconceptions about
evolutionary processes, or just a matter of habit. However, there is also
overwhelming evidence that many students are unable to read cladograms: even
many graduate students of biology pay more attention to the left–right ordering of
taxon names on the cladograms tips, than to the topology of the cladogram
displayed beneath the taxon names.
A further problem is that students often regard Linnean categories (i.e., labels
such as ‘‘family’’, ‘‘subphylum’’, ‘‘order’’ etc.) as scientiﬁc statements. They assume
that the different levels in the Linnean hierarchy have distinct meanings and that the
assignment of a given category to any one taxon is either right or wrong. Of course,
Linnean categories are entirely arbitrary and do not carry any information
whatsoever (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1992; Ereshefsky 1994, 2001, 2002;
Donoghue 2001). This misconception is further reinforced by the fact that many
textbook authors tend to adjust the resolution of cladograms to Linnean categories
(for a refreshing exception, see Ax 1995–2001). In other words, taxa that got
Linnean categories attached to them are overrepresented among the tips of
cladograms. In some textbooks, this is even aggravated by the pruning of less-
known (and supposedly less important) branches (i.e., O’Hara’s second narrative
device). Cladograms therefore often only display the taxon names that the students
are supposed to memorise, which is a somewhat biased sample of the taxa that in
fact exist in nature.
These problems re-enforce each other in misleading at least untrained readers of
cladograms. To be sure, none of those problems is solved by avoiding
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123anthropocentricism in cladograms alone. It is at least as important to teach students
how to read cladograms (O’Hara 1997; Sandvik, unpublished manuscript). O’Hara
(1992, p. 156) emphasized that it ‘‘should always be made clear in a tree diagram
that it is the topological relations of the branches that carries meaning, and not their
left-to-right positioning’’. However, stating this point somewhere in the vicinity of a
tree diagram does not prevent the readers of the diagram from unconsciously
noticing the implicit sequencing of taxa. As graphs appeal to the optical memory,
the right taxon will almost necessarily be remembered as the ‘‘focal’’ one, even if
the accompanying text tells the reader otherwise. In addition to increased awareness
about the fact that tree thinking is an ability that has to be acquired, authors and
teachers should become more aware of how they present cladograms. It they are not,
it turns out that more or less unconsciously the result becomes anthropocentrically
biased.
This seems to suggest that other modes to determine taxa positions along the left–
right axis should be considered by authors and teachers. Several such alternatives to
the anthropocentric mode have been proposed. de Queiroz and Gauthier (1992)
suggested to sort taxa according to the number of species contained in them: at each
node, the taxon encompassing most species—either described or estimated,
excluding or including fossil ones—is placed to the right of the smaller taxon (cf.
Figs. 2b, c and 3). Secondly, several authors seem to use a kind of implicit
complexity measure: at each node, the taxon having acquired more, or more
complex, autapomorphies is placed to the right of the taxon that has undergone less
evolutionary change. This is evidently how e.g., Ax (1995–2001) has ordered taxa
in cladograms that do not contain Homo sapiens—even though this criterion is
repeatedly violated in cladograms that do contain us. A third alternative, which has
been carried through in a Norwegian textbook of mine (Sandvik 2001), is alphabetic
order: at each node the two taxa are ordered simply by their scientiﬁc names. There
are advantages and disadvantages to all those methods. The latter one is deliberately
arbitrary. It is perhaps best suited to illustrate that left–right order does indeed not
carry any meaning whatsoever. The apomorphy-based method is somewhat more in
accordance with intuition. However, it accepts the horizontal orientation of a
cladogram as a narrative axis, at which most change occurs. This, and the fact that
there is no objective measure of the complexity of autapomorphous (or any other)
traits (Johnson 1968; Ghiselin 1969; Grifﬁths 1973), suggests that this method has
its weaknesses. The method based on species numbers might be the best in order to
express the importance of taxa in terms of biodiversity. As such, this method might
be recommended for most uses.
All three methods are probably better than leaving the left–right ordering to
‘‘chance’’, since the result is not random at all, but anthropocentrically biased. This
is most likely explainable by an innate psychological bias to think anthropocen-
trically. If this disposition is not kept in check by conscious decisions, it obviously
introduces systematic biases in how we choose to represent evolutionary history.
These ﬁndings do of course not relate to the validity of the scientiﬁc results
displayed by the cladograms. To the contrary, it is exactly because the graphical
representation of the results is irrelevant to their correctness that scientists are
entirely free to choose whatever resolution and ordering of taxa they like. Only
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way they do and may thereby reveal some underlying expectations or worldviews of
the scientists. Given that textbook authors—particularly cladistic ones—should be
expected to be especially aware of issues that can confuse or mislead readers, this
subconscious bias seems to be strong indeed.
In conclusion, the cladistic revolution has indeed largely removed three of the
narrative devices that distort accounts of evolutionary history. However, two
devices can also be found in cladistic depictions of phylogenetic relationships, viz.
differential resolution of branches and left–right ordering. The latter narrative
device has been found to be present even in textbooks that explicitly adopt a
cladistic perspective. O’Hara (1992, pp. 154–156) has provided a very useful guide
on how to ‘‘tell the tree’’, and authors of textbooks and of original papers presenting
phylogenetic research would proﬁt from following those suggestions. The current
paper illustrates that having the right intentions does not sufﬁce to produce unbiased
evolutionary narratives. Obviously, the subconsciousness even of trained cladists is
more anthropocentric than we would like to acknowledge.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Ax P (1995–2001) Das System der Metazoa. Ein Lehrbuch der phylogenetischen Systematik, 3 volumes,
Fischer, Stuttgart, and Spektrum, Heidelberg (English translation, 1996–2003, Multicellular
animals, Springer, Berlin)
Darwin C (1859) On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured
races in the struggle for life. Murray, London
de Queiroz K, Gauthier J (1992) Phylogenetic taxonomy. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 23:449–480
Donoghue MJ (2001) A wish list for Systematic Biology. Syst Biol 50:755–757
Ereshefsky M (1994) Some problems with the Linnean hierarchy. Philos Sci 61:186–205
Ereshefsky M (2001) The poverty of the Linnean hierarchy: a philosophical study of biological
taxonomy, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology, 15 (ed. M. Ruse). Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge
Ereshefsky M (2002) Linnean ranks: vestiges of a bygone era. In: Barrett JA, Alexander JMcK (eds) PSA
2000: proceedings of the 2000 biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association. Part II:
symposia papers. Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, Michigan, pp S305–S315
Farris JS (1976) Expected asymmetry of phylogenetic trees. Syst Zool 25:196–198
Felsenstein J (2004) Inferring phylogenies. Sinauer, Sunderland
Ghiselin MT (1969) The principles and concepts of systematic biology. In: Sibley CG, Alexander RD,
Constance L, Corliss JO, Cowan RS, Lockhart WR, Mayr E, Wagner WH Jr (eds) Systematic
biology. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, pp 45–66
Grifﬁths GCD (1973) Some fundamental problems in biological classiﬁcation. Syst Zool 22:338–343
Guyer C, Slowinski JB (1991) Comparisons of observed phylogenetic topologies with null expectations
among three monophyletic lineages. Evolution 45:340–350
Halstead LB (1978) The cladistic revolution – can it make the grade? Nature (Lond) 276:759–760
Hennig W (1950) Grundzu ¨ge einer Theorie der Phylogenetischen Systematik. Deutscher Zentralverlag,
Berlin
Johnson LAS (1968) Rainbow’s end: the quest for an optimal taxonomy. Proc Linn Soc N S W 93:1–45
[reprinted, 1970, Syst Zool 19:203–39]
Anthropocentricisms in cladograms 439
123Kirkpatrick M, Slatkin M (1993) Searching for evolutionary patterns in the shape of a phylogenetic tree.
Evolution 47:1171–1181
Mayr E, Bock WJ (2002) Classiﬁcations and other ordering systems. J Zool Syst Evol Res 40:169–194
Mooers AØ (1995) Tree balance and tree completeness. Evolution 49:379–384
Mooers AØ, Heard SB (2002) Developing uses for phylogenetic tree shape in the study of evolution. Syst
Biol 51:833–929
Nielsen C (2001) Animal evolution: interrelationships of the living phyla, 2nd edn. Oxford University
Press, Oxford
O’Hara RJ (1992) Telling the tree: narrative representation and the study of evolutionary history. Biol
Philos 7:135–160
O’Hara RJ (1997) Population thinking and tree thinking in systematics. Zool Scr 26:323–329
R development core team (2005) R: a language and environment for statistical computing, version 2.1.1,
URL: http://www.r-project.org, R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Wien
Romer AS (1959) The vertebrate story, 4th edn. Chicago University Press, Chicago
Sandvik H (2001) Dyrenes evolusjon – en innføring i systematisk zoologi og dyrenes stamtre. Tapir,
Trondheim
Scott JA (1986) The butterﬂies of North America: a natural history and ﬁeld guide. Stanford University
Press, Stanford
Slowinski JB (1990) Probabilities of n-trees under two models: a demonstration that asymmetrical interior
nodes are not improbable. Syst Zool 39:89–94
Waddell PJ, Okada N, Hasegawa M (1999) Towards resolving the interordinal relationships of placental
mammals. Syst Biol 48:1–5
440 H. Sandvik
123